Prince Maurice at the
Battle of Nieuwpoort by Pauwels van Hillegaert. Oil on canvas
In 1568 the Dutch began their long battle for independence
from Spain and would remain at war intermittently for 80 years. The problems
faced by the young Dutch republic played an important role in the military
reforms that would take place there over several decades to come. Although many
of these reforms centred on infantry organization, drill and tactics, the
nature of warfare in the Netherlands would be one of many more sieges than
battles.
The name most often associated with the Dutch reform
movement is Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625). He was the son of William the Silent
who had been one of the main leaders of the Dutch revolt. In 1684, at the age
of only 17, he became Stadthalter of Holland and Zeeland. In 1590, he was made
captain-general of all of the Dutch forces and was then in a position to
undertake his reforms.
Like many of the military men of his age, Maurice hoped to
emulate the military establishments of antiquity, in particular the Romans.
Maurice read military manuals from antiquity, in particular those of Vegetius, Aelian,
and the Taktika of the Byzantine emperor, Leo, as well as the works of
contemporary commentators such as Justus Lipsius. What emerged for Maurice was
an emphasis on regular standing forces and the importance of discipline and
drill. But within the context of classical antiquity, Maurice also saw the
importance of making more effective use of the constantly improving technology
of gunpowder weapons.
One of the most important changes instituted by Maurice was
the creation of a standing army. The army was still made up primarily of
foreigners serving for pay. Some of these were mercenaries in the traditional
sense, while others were foreign troops sent by their monarchs to serve under Dutch
command and at Dutch expense (notably from England). In 1603, for example, the
Dutch army consisted of a total of 132 companies. Of that number there were 43
English, 32 French, 20 Scottish, 11 Walloon, 9 German and a mere 17 Dutch. The
main reason for the preponderance of foreigners was the relatively small
population of the Netherlands, combined with the need to keep an army in the
field almost constantly for 80 years. Maurice recognized that keeping these
companies in his service all year round, rather than discharging them in the off-season
or at the end of a campaign, would make the Dutch army a more effective
fighting force in the long run.
The maintenance of this standing army also allowed Maurice
to initiate new standards of discipline and drill. In this, Maurice was aided
by his cousins William Louis and John, counts of Nassau. Maurice and his
cousins oversaw the standardization of drill, and equipment, so that all the
troops in Dutch service would be using the same methods regardless of their
origin. The length of the pike and the armour of the pikemen, as well as the
length and calibre of firearms were all standardized. Perhaps more important
was the codification of drill at this time in the 'Dutch Discipline'. All words
of command as well as the manual of arn1S for both the pike and arquebus and
musket were regularized. In 1607 Jacob de Gheyn's Wapenhandelinghe was
published - a complete manual of arms for pike, arquebus and musket illustrated
with 116 plates, accompanied by the appropriate commands and a commentary.
Maurice also modified the military organization and tactics
of the Dutch infantry. Once again Maurice turned to antiquity for inspiration.
He hoped to replicate the flexibility of the Roman legion by creating units
based upon the cohort to replace the large unwieldy regiments and tercios of
his own time. To that end, he reorganized each Dutch regiment into two or more
battalions. In theory, each battalion was to be 550 men, the same size as a
cohort in Vegetius' antique legio, and was made up of 250 pikemen and 300 men
armed with firearms, 60 of which were to form a line of skirmishers. The pikes
were to form in the centre of the battalion with arquebusiers and musketeers on
the wings.
Moreover, these units drew up in fewer ranks than the
earlier regiments and tercios; figures vary but the pikes seem to have been
between five and ten deep and the shot between eight and 12 ranks deep. The
shot were trained to use countermarch fire, a tactic inspired by Aelian. In
this formation the files of shot had intervals between them wide enough for a
man to march.
The first soldiers in the file would fire a volley and then
do an about face, marching back through the intervals and join the rear rank,
all the while going through the drill to reload their weapons. This would be followed
by the men of the second rank and then the third and so on. By the time men
from the front rank returned to their original position, they would be reloaded
and ready to fire another volley and start the drill all over again. This
method of firing required great discipline but created a constant volume of
fire from the unit. When threatened by cavalry, the arquebusiers and musketeers
would retire behind 26 the pikes without disrupting the formation. In battle,
the Dutch usually formed their battalions in three lines of battle. These lines
could be staggered to resemble a chequerboard so that the battalions in the
individual lines could support one another. This bears a striking resemblance
to the Roman acies triplex of a legion drawn up in similar formation. Maurice
laid the foundations for the early modern standing army based on constant drill
and a high standard of discipline. He also developed a system of tactics that
truly integrated pike and shot in a coherent fashion. Ironically, throughout
the two decades of conflict with Spain, Maurice was only twice able to take his
army into battle (both were victories), yet found himself participating in no
fewer than 29 sieges.
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