Napoleon at the Battle of Rivoli, by Philippoteaux (Galerie des Batailles, Palace of Versailles)
Fought on the hilly ground between Lake Garda and the
Adige River, a dozen miles northwest of Verona, the Battle of Rivoli
was Bonaparte’s most decisive victory in his first Italian campaign. The
defeat at Rivoli led to the failure of the last Austrian attempt at
relieving Mantua. After the capitulation of the fortress at the
beginning of February 1797, Bonaparte could move his army to the
Austrian borders, thus speeding up the chain of events leading to the
end of the war in Italy and the Peace of Campo Formio.
After the Battle of Arcola in November 1796, both
armies, tired, depleted, and worn to rags, would have welcomed a period
of rest in winter quarters. Their hopes were to remain unfulfilled.
After recent French defeat in Germany, the Directory looked toward peace
and sent Minister Henri Clarke to Italy for armistice talks. Expecting
Mantua to surrender very soon, Bonaparte opposed a cease-fire. It was
the Aulic Council in Vienna, however, that entertained stronger reasons
for reopening hostilities in Italy as soon as possible. The first was to
make a new attempt at rescuing Mantua before lack of supplies and
malarial disease forced Feldmarschall Dagobert Graf Würmser to
capitulate. Political reasons were also at work. To the lower social
classes supporting the ancien régime, the fall of Mantua would mean the
final victory of the French Revolutionary cause in Italy. Moreover, the
pope might be forced to consent to wage war against Revolutionary France
by a new show of Austrian military enterprise. Such pressing needs led
Vienna to send orders to the Austrian commander in Italy,
Feldzeugmeister Joseph Alvinczy Freiherr von Berberek, for a new
campaign that- rather unusually-was to begin in winter.
Beginning in December, a constant inflow of
replacements started filling the gaps in the Austrian army. Admittedly,
the quality of the new troops-recruits, Vienna volunteers, depot
units-was on the average poor. By the new year, however, Alvinczy could
field about 47,000 men for campaign service, the Mantua garrison (about
20,000) and some thousands for rear duties not included.
Once again, the Austrian plan to relieve Mantua,
devised by the same Colonel Franz Weyrother later responsible for the
plan at Austerlitz, provided for two separate lines of advance. A
diversionary force, in two columns under Feldmarschalleutnant Adam
Freiherr von Bajalich (6,000 men) and Feldmarschalleutnant Giovanni
Marquis di Provera (9,000), would, respectively, push westward over the
plain toward Verona and Legnago. By feinting operations on the Adige,
they intended to draw Bonaparte’s attention. Despite the approaching
winter, however, the main thrust was to be delivered from the Alps.
Under the direct command of Alvinczy, about 28,000 men in six columns
would move from Trento down the Adige valley and through the chain of
mountains (collectively called Monte Baldo) between the Adige and Lake
Garda. After breaking through the bottleneck at Rivoli, they would make
for Mantua.
This plan apparently rested on some uncertain
assumptions: (1) that a substantial part of Bonaparte’s army was south
of the Po preparing to invade the Papal States; (2) that Bonaparte would
mistake the diversionary force for the main army and would concentrate
most French troops behind the Adige from Verona to Legnago; (3) that
consequently only minor forces would be left at the strong defensive
position of Rivoli in the upper Adige valley and, once attacked, they
would not be able to receive immediate support; (4) that the Austrian
columns could advance over mountain roads and tracks covered with snow
in a coordinated way and with relatively small manpower consumption; and
(5) that Würmser could actively cooperate by launching sorties from
Mantua. None of these assumptions turned out to be valid.
The (French) Armée d’Italie had also received some
replacements. Its general situation, however, did not look good. Besides
the chronic lack of equipment and supplies, after nine months of
campaigning Bonaparte had run short of capable generals and knew that
the fighting quality of his troops was declining. The French deployment
in January 1797 was as follows: General Pierre Augereau’s division
(9,000 men) behind the Adige between Verona and Legnago; André Masséna’s
(9,000) around Verona; Barthélemy Catherine Joubert’s (10,250) at
Rivoli and on Monte Baldo; General Antoine Rey’s (4,100) at Brescia and
along the western shore of the Garda; a reserve under General Claude
Victor (2,400) at Castelnuovo and Villafranca; and General Thomas
Alexandre Dumas’s and Claude Dallemagne’s blockading corps (10,200)
around Mantua. To the south of the Po, there was only a small column
under General Jean Lannes, with 2,000 French and several thousand
Italian troops.
On 7 January Bonaparte left for Bologna, where three
days later he received the news that Provera’s column had appeared
before Legnago. He immediately ordered Lannes back to the Adige, and
rushed to his headquarters at Roverbella, just north of Mantua, where he
arrived probably early on the twelfth. As Alvinczy had hoped, by that
time Bonaparte still believed that the main threat was on the lower
Adige and thus made his dispositions accordingly. Later that day,
however, he started receiving reports announcing that Joubert was under
attack at La Corona, a steep defile on Monte Baldo, five miles north of
Rivoli. To ascertain the real magnitude of this new threat, Bonaparte
asked Joubert for more information. Early on the thirteenth, Joubert
realized that he was facing a strong and determined army (actually,
28,000 men). While three of Alvinczy’s columns were marching down the
valley roads along the Adige (Prince Reuss’s and Ocksay’s on the
western, Vukassovich on the eastern bank), three other columns
(Köblös’s, Lipthay’s, and Lusignan’s) trudged along the tracks of Monte
Baldo covered with snow. Later in the afternoon, fearing being
outflanked, Joubert withdrew to Rivoli.
By 3:00 P. M., thanks to Joubert’s reports, Bonaparte
knew that the main attack was coming from the north. He reacted
swiftly, rushing Masséna with three demi-brigades and some cavalry to
Rivoli. Rey’s division was also ordered to move to Rivoli, a brigade
under General Joachim Murat being ferried across Lake Garda.
At Rivoli, where now both Bonaparte and Alvinczy were
expecting to fight a decisive battle, less than four miles separated
the Adige from Lake Garda. Over this ground, a two-layer amphitheater
facing the southern slopes of Monte Baldo formed one of the strongest
defensive positions anywhere in the Italian Alps. The village of Rivoli
lay (and still lies) in the center of this hilly semicircle that
stretches to the north, the west, and the south, with the steep bank of
the Adige to the east. The outward and higher layer of the amphitheater
has a diameter of about three miles, starting from the Chapel of San
Marco to the north, and ending at Monte Pipolo to the south. A milewide
plateau runs throughout its extension. Three villages, San Giovanni,
Caprino, and Pesina (from east to west), are located on the plateau
along the banks of a small stream called the Tasso. The inner layer has a
diameter of a mile and a half.
A peculiar feature made Rivoli an excellent defensive
position. While the defender could easily undertake operations with all
three arms (infantry, cavalry, and artillery), a network of relatively
good roads being available to approach the battlefield from the south,
the attacker had no such facility, as the northern accesses from Monte
Baldo, even in more favorable weather, were only practicable to
infantry. This suggested that Alvinczy’s field artillery and cavalry
should file along the roads on either side of the Adige. From the river
valley bottom, the only exit to the Rivoli amphitheater was by the road
on the western bank. It led to the Dogana Inn and the main village,
after winding up to an inner plateau through a steep, narrow, and easily
defensible defile.
By the evening of 13 January, Joubert had deployed
his troops over a restricted area along the edges of the inner plateau,
where they could take advantage of some entrenchments. Three Austrian
columns (from east to west, under Ocksay, Köblös, and Lipthay,
respectively) had encamped for the night on the heights north of the
Tasso. Lusignan was farther to the west, with orders to make a long
outflanking detour and reach the southern side of the amphitheater at
Monte Pipolo, thus cutting off Joubert’s line of retreat and preventing
Bonaparte from sending him support. Lusignan’s column was, however,
considerably behind schedule because of the snow and the bad dirt
tracks.
Bonaparte joined Joubert during the night, rushing
ahead of Masséna’s troops. From Bonaparte’s recollections and most
French sources, we learn that once on the spot he immediately recognized
the enemy plan and took adequate countermeasures. As a matter of fact,
later that night Joubert’s division advanced to regain control of the
outward plateau south of the Tasso. In this sector, about 9,000 French
were now facing 12,000 Austrians, the latter being short of artillery
and rations.
Following the French advance, skirmishes broke out at
daybreak on the fourteenth. The combat rapidly escalated along the
line, ebbing and flowing, but with no decisive outcome. After a couple
of hours, around 9:00 A. M., Lipthay managed to outflank the French left
and routed two demi-brigades (the 29th and 85th). By that time,
however, the awaited reinforcements appeared on the southern edge of the
battlefield. Masséna brought the 32nd forward, and by 10:30 A. M. the
French left was restored. Farther east, the 14th demi-brigade, under
General Louis-Alexandre Berthier, were gallantly resisting Ocksay’s
attack. Meanwhile, Prince Reuss’s column had started climbing up the
road leading from the valley bottom to the inner plateau, receiving
substantial support from the guns Vukassovich had deployed on the
eastern bank of the Adige. On higher ground, the 39th demi-brigade put
up fierce resistance against an enemy that was numerically superior, but
was forced to advance uphill in long road columns. With great
perseverance, Reuss’s troops eventually succeeded in pushing the French
out of their entrenchments and started streaming over the inner plateau.
The prospect of a junction between the column from
the Adige and those coming down the ridge posed a serious threat to the
French right flank and rear. Joubert and Berthier set to work, however,
to rally their men for a counterattack against Reuss. Meanwhile, about
250 cavalry under generals Charles-Victor Leclerc and Antoine Lasalle
charged the troops under Köblös and Ocksay, which after hours of
fighting lay scattered on the plateau. Some Austrian units apparently
panicked and started retreating, partly uphill, partly down the road to
the Adige valley bottom, the latter causing some disorder in Reuss’s
tightly packed column. It is believed that at this crucial point two
Austrian ammunition wagons exploded, thus spreading further chaos among
the infantry ranks. Certainly it is a fact that most of Reuss’s units
broke and fled down the road to the Adige. With effective cavalry and
artillery support, Joubert and Masséna moved forward again and took
definitive control of the outward plateau and the villages, repulsing
the Austrians toward Monte Baldo.
As the main action was being fought, around 11:00 A.
M. Lusignan’s column appeared on Monte Pipolo, at the southern edge of
the amphitheater. It was, however, too late for Lusignan’s force to
influence the battle’s outcome. Even worse, he found himself trapped
between the French army at Rivoli and the reinforcements approaching
from the south. Attacked from many sides, Lusignan’s men retreated in
great disorder, leaving hundreds of prisoners behind. By late afternoon,
the Battle of Rivoli was over and Alvinczy’s army in full retreat.
Bonaparte did not sleep on the battlefield. Being
informed that Provera was now in sight of Mantua, he entrusted Joubert
with the pursuit of the Austrian army (which Bonaparte’s subordinate
duly embarked on, clashing again with Alvinczy on the fifteenth) and
then himself rushed with Masséna’s and Victor’s divisions to face the
new threat. Austrian losses at the Battle of Rivoli and in the following
pursuit are estimated at 14,000 dead, wounded, stragglers, and
prisoners. The French had 5,000 losses. On this figure, however, sources
are obscure, as usual.
At Rivoli Bonaparte showed most of his superior
military skills at their best. The concentration of his army at Rivoli
was executed at an exceptional speed, the night march of Masséna’s
division being one of the keys to victory. During the battle, Bonaparte
succeeded in always keeping his numerically inferior army concentrated
in a central position. He was, moreover, also favored by the excellent
defensive ground, some faulty assumptions made by his opponents, the
poor general quality of the Austrian army, and the lack of coordination
between Alvinczy and his subordinates.
Had Provera succeeded in arriving at Mantua on 13
January, he would have forced Bonaparte to choose between two
alternatives: to rush in support of Joubert, thus risking Mantua being
rescued; or to reinforce the French forces around the fortress, thus
abandoning Joubert to his fate. In either case, the outcome of the
campaign would have not been the same.
References and further reading
Boycott-Brown, Martin. 2001. The Road to Rivoli: Napoleon’s First
Campaign. London: Cassell. Esposito, Vincent J., and John R. Elting.
1999. A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars. London:
Greenhill.
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